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ABSTRACT
The thesis of this study is that the goal of
political democracy, which was based on Kenya's
"African Socialism," has over time fallen in
abeyance because the political leaders underestimated
possible barriers (such as ethnic-political conflict)
when defining the ideas of "African Socialism."
This study evaluates Kenya's economic, political,
and social systems in operation before white conquest,
during colonialism, and after independence.

This

approach is analytical and explains how the system
as a whole functions or fails to function.
The thesis concludes that the government's goal
of political democracy has not been met because it was
based on misconceived notions of "African Socialism."
African tribalism existed before "African Socialism"
and continues to dominate the Kenya society.
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PREFACE
Most writers on African politics have been Western
scholars.

Obvious differences in culture, religion,

language, customs, and even manners may often result
in conflicts between western and African perspectives..
Other writers on African politics are African
politicians.

They represent poor economies and under

developed political systems.- Their feelings for
fellow Africans and the zeal of African nationalism,
results sometimes in misplaced emphasis, misrepresen
tations, and distortion of facts.
There is a considerable amount of literature
dealing with Kenyan society.

Critics may argue that

everything that is essential has already been written,
but- political scientists have, on the whole, neglected
the comparative study of political systems in African
tribes.

This study does not claim to be the final

word on Kenya.

It is rather an attempt to examine

Kenya from several perspectives, explaining how the
country, as a whole, has functioned or failed to
function.
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The thesis of this study is that the goal of
political democracy, based1 on Kenya's "African
Socialism" was and is incompatible with the tribal political culture of Kenya's politically dominant
tribe, the Kikuyu.

"Political democracy" is to be

understood as a principle founded on respect of the
human being--every human being, and implies the
acceptance of .equality of all citizens regardless
of race or tribe.

Political democracy must also

guarantee every individual the full rights of
democratic citizenship without discrimination.
In the African sense,

"Socialism" meant mutual

caring, democratic equality of individuals, and
"rational" utilization of the factors of production
for the benefit of all the people.

The government

had the responsibility to control this process and •
to ensure that economic and political development
functioned according to the dictates of mutual
social responsibility and is generally.understood
to include among its goals:
1.

political equality;

2.

social justice;

3.

human dignity including freedom of conscience
freedom from want, disease, and exploitations

5.

Equal opportunities; and

6.

high and growing per capita incomes,
equitably distributed.!

The government of Kenya, as well as its only
political party, the Kenyan African National Union
(KANU), has based its program of modernization and
development on the illusory supposition that the.
intertribal independence which mobilized black
Kenyans in the struggle for unity could be perpetuated
after liberation.

Thus, cultural fragmentation along

tribal lines was to be1replaced by Kenyan nationalism,
producing a political community drawing upon shared
traditional values but resistant to ethnic cultural
incompatabilities.
These aspi,rations and expectations were best
articulated in Kenya Government Sessional Paper
Number’ 10, 1965*

"African Socialism and its Application

to Planning in Kenya", Ministry of Information, Kenya
1965» pp. 1-18.

In brief summary the following are

some elements of "African Socialism".
In the phrase "African Socialism", the ■
.
word "African" is not introduced to describe a
continent to which a foreign ideology is to be
transplanted.

It is meant to convey the African

roots of a system that is itself African in its ,
characteristics.

African Socialism is a term

describing an African political and economic

system that is positively"African

not being

imported from any country or being a blueprint
of any foreign ideology but capable of incorpora
ting useful and compatible techniques from whatever
source.

. .

There are two African traditions which form
an essential basis for African Socialism-political democracy and mutual social responsi
bility.

Political democracy implies that each

member of society is equal in his political rights
and that no individual or group will be permitted
to exert .undue influence on the policies of the
state.

The State, therefore, can never become

the tool of special interests, catering to the
desires of a minority at the expense of the needs
of the majority.

The State will represent all

of the people and will do so impartially and without
prejudice.
Political democracy in the African tradition
would not, therefore,

countenance a party of the

elite, s t e m tests or discriminatory criteria for
party membership, degrees of party membership, or
first and second class citizens.

In African

Socialism, every member of society is important,
and equal; every mature citizen can belong to the
party without restriction or discrimination; and
the party will entertain and accommodate different

points of view, African Socialism rests on full,
equal and unfettered democracy.
Mutual social responsibility is an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a
whole, with the hope that ultimately the. same
spirit.can be extended to even larger areas.
First of all, although the paper was launched in
an atmosphere of national unity and appeared to be a
unifying force of the Kenyan people, it was not
entirely so.

Popular interest and involvement in the

political system caused frequent tribal conflicts.

In

addition, the social system was internally stratified
so that it was less likely to organize an integrated
society.
The document, launched in immediate post-indepen-dence euphoria, was both unrealistic and dissembling.
Tribal particularism did not wither away but rather
intensified as political participation and institutionbuilding increased.

Social stratification further

undermined ephemeral national unity.

The document did

not reflect a unified political culture but mixed
indigenous and western ideas which were often nebulously
understood and incompatible, eliciting the vigorous
dissent of Oginga Odinga, among others, who wrote :

In the mouths of 'the government and KANU
leaders,."African Socialism" has become a
meaningless phrase.

What they call African

Socialism is neither African nor socialism.
It is a cloak for the practice of total
capitalism.

To describe the policies .of the

present government as "African Socialism" is
an insult to the intelligence of people.

The

deception is obvious, but the leaders of the
government and of KANU do not have the courage
to admit that they are fully committed to the
western ideology of capitalism. 2
Odinga°s skepticism is reflected in a similar state
ment by Julius Nyerere:
We in Africa have no more need of being
converted to socialism than we have of being
taught democracy.
m

Both are rooted in our past-. .
.
2
the traditional society which produced us. -

Regardless of the

geriuiness of KANUV;s devotion to

"African Socialism", the political democratic goals
articulated in the document ignored the reality of inter
tribal conflict in Kenya.

The authors of the document

were most probably aware of this undermining incompati
bility.

In order to prove these assertions this thesis

will first describe and analyze Kenyan culture prior .to

independence,

emphasizing'both the unifying and dis-

unifying elements between the tribal cultures.

Second

the thesis will describe the British colonial policy
of "divide and conquer, unity and rule."

And third,

the*thesis will conclude with an analysis of postindependencc Kenyan politics when the incompatibilitye
between nation-building and tribal loyalties all but
unmasked the goals of political democracy and "African
Socialism" as unattainable if not undesired.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND PRE-COLONIAL SETTING
Kenya covers an area of approximately 225>000
square miles, and consists of seven politicogeographic regions; the Rift Valley, Central Province,
Eastern Province, Nyanza Province, Northeastern Provinc
CoastrPrbvince', Western Province," and Nairobi Province.
The Rift Valley is the largest of the Provinces,
(Fig. 1) slicing through the center of the country
from its southernmost border, with Tanzania to the
western side of Lake. Turkana.

It is populated by the

Kalenjin, Samburu, Dorobo and Kikuyu tribes.
Province,'Largely populated by the Kikuyus,
east of the Rift Valley,

.Central
lies to the

southwest of Mt. Kenya.

third largest of the provinces is Eastern.
common frontier with Ethiopia.

The

It has a

The main tribes are

the Turkana, Meru, Embu, Kamba, and nomadic Rendille
and Boran.

Northeastern is sparsely populated, lying

along the Kenya-Somali border.

It is mainly populated ■

by the Somali.1 Coast Province lies on the Indian Ocean
Its tribes include Bayun, Galla, Giriama, Rabai, Digo,
Taita, and Taveta.
through Lake Nyanza.
peopled by L u o .

The Nyanza Province runs northward
The province is. predominantly

Western Province touches the Uganda-.

Kenya border and is peopled mainly by the Luyia.
Nairobi Province is centrally located and is the
center of government.

Its inhabitants come from

all over the country.
The following list, based on 1970 census data,
gives a good picture of the location of population
and tribal composition of the provinces.

T r a d it io n a l
E th n ic G ro u p

N um ber

P e rc e n t

O c c u p a tio n

A griculture
o ---------. . . do - - *
-------- do - - - - - do - - -

Kenyan Africans
Kikuyu ................... .
Luo • . . „ ................... ..
Luhya ....................... ...
K a m b a....................... .
Kalenjin ...................

2,201,632
1,521,695
1,453,302
1,197,712
1,190,203

20.12
13.91
13.28
10.95
10.88

Kisii ( G u s ii) .............
M eru ..........................
M ijikenda . . . . .........

701,679
554,256
520,620

6.41
6.07
4.76

S o m a li........................
Turkana .............................
M a s a i..........................
E m b u .......................................
T a i t a ..........................
lteso ( T e s o ) ....................
K uria (T e n d a ) .............
S a m b u ru .............................
T h a ra k a .....................
Mbere ........................
P o ko m o .................................

250,112
203,177
154,906
117,969
108,494
85,800
59,875
54,7%
51.883
49,247
35,181

2.29
1.86
1.42
1.08
0.78
0.54
0.50
0.45
0.45
0.32

B o ran ..........................
B a ju n .......................................

34,086
24,387

0.31
0.22

Nderobo (D orobo). .

21,034

0.19

, R end ille..................
O r m a .....................
Gabbra .................
S w ahili-Shirazi. ..

18,729
16,306
16.108
9,971

0.17
0.15
0.15
0.09

N je m p s .................
T aveta ................. ..
Sakuve .................
Bond .....................

6,520
6,324
4,369

0.00
0.06
0.04

3,972

0.04

!

Sanve1 ................... ..

I

1 .0 0

2.928

0.03

Total ................. . . 10,677,079
N oxi-Kenyan
A fric a n s *...........
56,123
Non-Africans*
139,037
A s ia n s '*.................
E u ro p e a n s ...........
40,593
27,886
A ra b s......................

97.58

207,516
1,987

1.89
0.02

10,942,705

100.00

Gosha.....................

Total .................
Others* ..........................
TOTAL

^ —

L in g u a ^ e
G ro u p

•

-------- d

d o -------- - A griculture, some
herding, fishing
Pastoralism
-------- do - - - - - do - - A griculture
-------- do - - -------- d o ---------- - - d o -------Pastoralism
Agriculture
- - - do - - A griculture and
fishing Pastoralism
Fishing and
agriculture
H unting and
gathering
. . .

-------- do

i

Pastoralism
- - - do - - - - - do - - Trade, fishing,
agriculture
Fishing
Agriculture and trade
Pastoralism
[ H unting and gathering
j Hunting, some
I
cultivating
A griculture

I r o vin c c

D iH in c i

Bantu
Nilotic
Bantu
-------- do - - Paranilotic

Central
Nyanza
Western
Eastern
R ift Valley

Bantu
. . . do - - ----- d o ----------

Nvanza
Eastern
Coast

Kiambu, M urang’a, N yeri, Kirin
Kisumu, Siaya, Homa Bay
Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega
Machakos, K itui
Kericho, Uasin Gishu, Kara 1
Nandi, Baringo, Elgeyo-M ara
Kisii
Meru
Kwale, K ilifi

Cushitic
Paranilotic
- - - d o -------Bantu
-------- do - - Paranilotic
Bantu
Paranilotic
Bantu
-------- do * - . . . do - - -

North-Eastern
Rift Valley
-------- do - - Eastern
Coast
Western
Nvanza
Rift Valley
Eastern
. . . d o -------Coast

Garissa" W a jir, Mandera
Turkana
K a jia d o .N a ro k
Embu
Taita
Bungoma
Homa Bay
Samburu
M eru
Embu
Tana R iver

Cushitic
Bantu

Eastern
Coast

Marsabit, Isiolu
Lamu

Paranilotic

R ift Valley

Laikipia, N akuru

Cushitic
. . . do - - . . . do - - *
Bantu

Eastern
Coast
Eastern
Coast

Marsabit
Tana River
Marsabit
Mombasa, Kwale

Paranilotic
Banfu
Cushitic
- - -d o -----

R ift Valley
Coast
Eastern
Coast

Baringo
Taita
Isiolo
Lamu

- - - do - - •

- - - do - - -

Tana R iver

- - - do - - -

North-Eastern

Mandera

0.51
1.27
0.37
0.25

* B om a n d R an y e w t-rv c o m b in e d in ce n au *
* M a in ly fro m T a m ta m * a n d to a le a n e r r i t e n t fro m U g a n d a ; ao m e fro m R w a n d a .
• In c o n tr a s t to A fric a n g ro u p * , n u m b e r* d e c lin e d a f te r 11*69, b u t p r r c ia e fig u re * w e r e n o t a v a ila b le in 1975.

4 A li j>enK>na o r ig in a tin g fro m A s ia e x c e p t th o ae fro m t h e M id d le..C aaL
• E th n ic g r o u p n o t sp e cifie d .

Source: Rased on information from Kenya, M inistry of Finance and Economic Planning, Statistics Division, Kenya Population, Census, 1969, I , Novei
1970.
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The majority of Kenya’s tribes are of Bantu stock,
which immigrated northward from south Central-Africa
in the first millenium A.D.

The largest tribe in this

group are the Kikuyus who live in the highlands around
Mt. Kenya.

Other Bantu tribes are the Embu; Meru;

Wakamba; Luyia; Kisii; and Nyika, or the Coastal Africans.
The Bantu tribes differ from the other groups in lan
guage and culture.

They also constitute a majority of

the population of Kenya.

They speak dialects unintel

ligible to the other groups and subsist mainly as
herdsman, keeping cattle and goats.

They also raise

some crops, notably maize and millet.

Some still hunt

and collect wild plants.
The Luos are racially and linguistically allied to
the Ugandan and Tanzanian Luos.
Nilotic group.

They belong to the

They were essentially small cultivators

(not pastoralists) using different types of hoes and
living on yams, millet, and fish.

They kept cattle

and sheep in small numbers and had no individual or
family rights to land.

Everyone grazed and watered his .

cattle wherever he wished.

They were involved in con

stant battles with the Luyia.

However, during times

of prosperity, temporary hospitality was extended
between neighboring families of the two tribes.

They

were confined to the Nyanza plateus and never came in
contact with other interior tribes.
unmixed with allied blood.

They remained

The Nandi and the Kalenjin are also non-Bantu.
They are excellent cultivators, but like the Bantus,
recognize cattle as symbols of wealth.

They live in

Rift Valley.
The Masai are Nilo-Hamites.

They lived in the

grasslands of southern Kenya and neighboring Tanzania.
They introduced many arts such as the working of iron
(previously unknown to the Bantus), and probably cattlea

keeping and sheep-rearing as well.

They are the greatest

fighters that Africa has ever known, with a superior
military tribal organization.

Although much smaller

than most of the tribes, they were perhaps the most
feared tribe in Kenya.

Owing to the grazing and water

needs of their livestock, they are essentially nomadic.
Like the Somali, Rendelles, and the Boran, they wander
intermittently following the movements of game in search
of water.
There are several other minor Kenyan tribes which
have distinct characteristics and are mainly closer to
the non-Bantu tribes.
All Kenyan tribes, except the Luos and Turkana
practice circumcision.

Through it, individuals gained

membership to an age-set, which provided them with new
identity in their community.

The grouping into age-sets

also provided a system of seniority ranking, the basis
of which important social duties--such as judicial,
military, and eldership--were allocated.

12
The Luos and Turkana also practice age-set
groupings however, the ascendency into the first adult
age set does not include the ceremony of circumcision.
Further examination into the traditional values
attached to adulthood among the Kikuyus reveals yet
another political dimension.

The Kikuyus "believe that

uninitiated men should not hold any political or public
office on behalf of the community, regardless of other
qualities.

All uncircumcised men had no membership in

the tribal community.

For example, they could not attend

political or judicial meetings.

Their testimony and

judgment was considered that of a child.

They could

not marry or mix freely within their respective tribes.
They were still children.
The Kikuyu tribe, for instance, use the word
"Kihii" to refer to uncircumeised men, regardless of
tribe or nationality.

They also use the word "Mwanake",

which is a more respectable word for a grown-up or a
circumcised man.

When pressed, the Kikuyu tribes

recognize a "real man" distinction between themselves
and the Luos because Luos are uncircumcised.

The

ancient tribal beliefs therefore still prevail.

One

might even argue that the cultural "mind" of the
Kikuyu does not exclude the Luo or Turkana man from
participating in non-leadership roles in government,
however an uncircumcised man as a national leader is
unthinkable.

On the other hand the absence of cultural

beliefs about circumcision•of Women does not preclude
their ascending to leadership in the Kikuyu "mind."
Strong tribal beliefs are also another important
ingredient in tribal culture.

In his analysis of

belief systems, Philip Converse describes a belief
system as follows:
. . . a belief system is a configuration of
beliefs in which the elements are bound together
by some form of constraint or functional interdependenc e .
'Hence, an evaluation of tribal beliefs and
their form of "constraint" or "functional inter
dependence" within a given tribe assures . . .
a reasonable degree of success in evaluating
some major elements of political conflict based
A
on beliefs or values held by various tribes.
Tribal beliefs are still held strongly as well in
Kenya today' and therefore Kenyan society is made up .of
incongruant systems of beliefs.

The success, of the

contemporary political system depends on major modifica
tion or total elimination of some of these beliefs
because they encourage conflict.

The last chapters

of this thesis will be concerned with the relationship
between types of beliefs and types of conflict.

It is not the purpose of1'this study, however to
stray into the broad and more difficult discussion of
Kenya's tribes and their past.

Rather, an analysis of

symbolic beliefs will be made to test the hypothesis.
In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Kenyatta argues,.,
that the structure of the Kikuyu government was demo
cratic prior to the advent of the Europeans.
At the first meeting, every village appointed
a representative to the council which passed laws
for the tribe.^
For the purposes of this study, the following laws
are important:
(1)

Universal tribal membership as the unification
of the whole tribe, the qualification for it
to be based on an individual's adult status and
not on the extent of his property.
reason,

For this

it was then decided that every member

of the community, after passing through the
circumcision ceremony as a sign of adulthood,
could take an active, part in the government:

. .

socially and politically all circumcised men
and women equally could be full members of the
tribe . . . the government would be in the hands
of councils of elders (Kiama) chosen from all
members of the community.

. . (Author's emphasis)

It should he noted that only those circumcised were
considered adults and therefore full voting members,
of the tribe.
On the central importance of circumcision, Godfred
Muriuki,

in his book on The History of the Kikuyu: „

1500-1900, writes:
The initiation rituals

^circumcision] drama

tized the symbolic "death of c h i l d h o o d a n d the
"birth" of adulthood.

Childhood had tied the young

to their family, their lineage or locality; adult
hood, on the other hand, flung the adolescents
into the willing arms of the community as a
whole . . . consequently, initiation was not a
private concern but a public and communal rite.
It was a crucial importance to the community as a
whole because it conferred social status upon the
initiates.

To the Kikuyu, circumcision was of

fundamental importance.

It stands for the whole

values embodied in the age.class system with all
its "educational,
implications.

social, moral and religious

It is a "conditio sine quo non"

for being a real Kikuyu and the visible and outward sign of adhering to the tribal cultures.

1

Circumcision was and is so fundamental to the definition
of an adult member of society, that the thought of an
•uncircumcised chronological adult having an active
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part in society, let alone, leadership,

is an

impossibility.
Despite tribal differences in culture, relative
wealth or living conditions, all tribes shared many
similarities in social structure.
the heart of the tribal society.

The "family" was,
The young members' of

the family had an obligation to help the older members.
Mutual helpfulness was a virtue not only essential but
also compulsory.

In addition all tribes encouraged

the worth and freedom of the individual.

The concept

of property rights among all tribes was directly, .related
to the mode of life.

Rights to the exclusive use of

anything resulted from work expended or habitual use
by a particular individual or group.

This was a

practical concept, and it seems to have entailed a
minimum of conflicts.

If a.Masai made a spear, or

if a Kikuyu built a hut, they were his.

However, the

materials used, in making the objects belonged to no
one.

Among the Luo, any family might fish in a

certain stream, but if a clan or a group of families
built a fishing canoe, it alone had a right to use
that boat.

Among the Kamba and the Kalenjin, the harvest

belonged to those who had planted the seeds.

These social

"laws" were upheld by the chief of the elders.
A spirit of social responsibility was also common
to all tribes.

If, for example, a member of a family

was in need of help, all individuals were willing and

ready to help.

The survival df the family and the

tribe depended on helpfulness and cooperation.

Greed,

as it is understood in materialist terms today, was
seldom present among the tribes.

Thus, while each

person maintained his individuality, he never did

»

so to the detriment of his community.
The tribal social life manifested itself at four
levels.

First of all, the intimate bonds of clan kin

ship afforded numerous opportunities for close fellow
ship within each family and between families.. People
enjoyed eating together, and hospitality was a norm of
life.

There was constant interchange of gifts between

members of each family and between families.

Everyone

agreed that for the general-good of the community,
was better to give than to receive.

it

Such rules of

hospitality were only within the tribe.
The second level of social life took place at the
community level.

The entire community shared in an

annual cycle of social and political events:
celebrations,

victory

dances, dissemination of all important

news, and in frequent marriage or initiation ceremonies.
The third level of social organization was natural
outcomes of the strong spirit of social cooperation
and identification of the individual in his community.
Community activities were played out in a heightened
sense at the tribal level:

craft displays, huge dances,

warrior adulation, games, and the like.

18

/

The process of politics in African tribes has been
described by Busia, a sociologist and former President
of Ghana;
African communities,

or tribes, developed

their own political systems before the period of
colonization . . .

.

Some communities and tribes

had highly developed political organizations with
hierarchies of office holders, from attendants to
Kings and Chiefs wielding varying degrees*of
authority.

Each organization was o n e .in which

different individuals played different roles, and
everyone had some degree of participation in
political life; for political organization was an
aspect of the social life in which everyone paro

ticipated.°
The most important basis of the political system
was., of course the tribe.
based on tribal principles.

The tribal government was
Within this same framework,

kinship relations with fellow tribesmen were an impor
tant base for political action.

All Kenya tribes were

ruled by a Chief, elected or hereditary, or by repre
sentatives to a council of elders.

As an example the

Kikuyu system of government as described by Kenyatta
is as follows;
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. .. .. it was based on true democratic
principles.

Each village appointed a represen

tative to the Council, and in order to maintain
harmony in the government in the country, it was
necessary to make a few rules which would act £.s
the guiding principles in the new government .- . .
The government should be in the hands of council of ,
elders chosen from all members of the community who
had reached the age of leadership.9
The tribe was in a total ,sense, an administrative
entity which contained a structure for central political
control.

The rulers (elders, chiefs) acted in conformity

with the laws of the tribe.

In cases of-any deviation

from those laws, the communities imposed.fines on their
rulers or Impeached them from office.

No tribe came

under the direct control of another tribe.
The chiefs and the elders also had connections within
the tribe which served as an important base for political
control.

These connections were established and main

tained through a rudimentary type of political organiza
tion, operating mostly through the kinship system.
Interestingly wealth was of great importance in attaining
political power.

The word of the richest man usually

commanded greater attention than that of the not so rich.
The rich were., in fact, the chiefs and the elders.

Another important. aspectJiof tribal, life related
to the methods of trade used by the tribes.

A casual

investigation shows similar economic values among all
tribal communities.

Each individual or family unit

produced nearly all the necessities of life for consump
tion.

Direct exchange in trading existed, but ther-e was

no common denominator in which to express the value of
products.
example,

Thus, the tribes used a barter system.

For

if an individual wanted to sell commodity A

for commodity B, it was necessary to determine the worth
of unit A before, accepting a B unit.

This required

expressing the value of commodity A in terms of the value
of commodity B, and vice versa.

This in turn required

mental calculations by the owner of each commodity as
well as endless bargaining which consumed both time
and energy.

It was also necessary to repeat the process

when trading commodities A for C, D, E, and so forth.
In recent times the creation of the Republic of
Kenya resulted In the fourth level of social organiza
tion- -the republic.
glomerate of tribes;

This republic was thus a con
the tribes were located in'one

area or another, and were comprised of family groups
that lived across the tribal land that they considered
their own.

The members defined themselves by the tribes

to which they belonged, perhaps as much or more than' by
their family affinities.

As a consequence,

tribal bonds became absolute.

their

These bonds and
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traditions were, so strong-that they encouraged dis
crimination against all non-tribal strangers whether.
they be black or white.
Tribal boundaries before colonialism were fairly
vague.

Each tribe seems to have claimed only the land

actually used by its members for cultivation and grazing.
Big stretches of uninhabited land and thick forests
divided them from their neighbors.

When war threatened,'

the land was marked to show boundaries of some kind.
This also demonstrated how deeply the people were
attached to their own territory.
In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta argues
that the cause of friction among tribes was economic.
There was no war of annexation of territory
or subjection.of one tribe to another . . .

.

The

Masai, whose lives depended entirely on the meat,
t

milk, and blood of animals, were forced by
necessity to raid the stock of their neighbors or
die of hunger and starvation. 10
Hostilities also consisted of feuds resulting from
woman-stealing and mere tribal suspicion.

Once revenge

had been taken, a series of reprisals and counter
reprisals might follow.

There were also occasions when

a tribe would form an alliance with members of a warring
tribe to raid fellow tribesmen.
relations, Kenyatta stated;

With regard ,to tribe

I n .territories where friendly relationship
was established, especially between the Kaptei
Masai and the southern Kikuyu, the warriors of
the two tribes joined together to invade another
section of Masai, like Loita or a section of Gikuyu,
like Mbeere or Tharaka. ^
In spite of occasional alliances such as these,
the Kikuyus were, always fighting with the Masai.
Although some aspects of tribal structure were
seriously affected by colonialism, regional isolation,
intertribal warfare, and tribal loyalties continued
after independence.

When the government set the goals

and objectives for development, the characteristics of
personal allegiance to customs, loyalty to the family
(defined in terms of a unit of close relatives), and
loyalty to the tribe were still the strongest bonds
felt by individuals.

This placed sharp limitations on

the political leaders working for a more balanced growth.
Long standing jealousies, tribal feuds, group loyalties
and the like were never seriously influenced by the new
government.

Even though the post-colonial governments

tried to lessen the impact of tribalism, the system still
persists.

In his writing on the "detribalized" African,

Max Gluckman makes the following point:

[the] African is always tribalized, both
in towns, and in rural areas; but he is tribalized
in two quite different ways.

As we see it, in the

rural areas he lives and is controlled in every
activity in an organized system of tribal
relations; in the urban areas tribal attachments
work within a setting.of urban association. 1 2
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THE BEGINNING OF COLONIALISM
Towards the end of the nineteenth century,
more than ninety percent of the African continent
was ruled hy Africans.

By 1900, all but a small

fraction of it was under European rule.

The lives of

.the Africans started being deeply affected by the
changes brought about by the foreign rulers.
The Colonial period in Africa lasted well
over eighty years.

The first thirty years of this

period may be called the years of establishment,
the next thirty may be called the years of active.
development, and the last twenty may be called the
years of retreat. 13
v

In this chapter, the writer will

deal with the years of establishment from the point of
view of the British government and from the point of
view of the Kenya Africans.

The years of active

development focus on economic and political events
during this period and their impact on the African
population.
■Finally, the writer will'address the question of
African nationalism that led to Kenya's independence.
Kenya was by far the most troubled territory in British

East Africa and offers an -interesting evaluation in
political and social conditions which are necessary
in, testing the thesis.
There are several theories regarding the justifi
cation of European colonialism in Africa.'
F. D. Lugard who epitomised other pioneers of colonialism in East Africa informed his countrymen in
I893 of the following:
The "Scramble for. Africa" by the nations of
Europe--an incident parallel in the history of
the world--was due to the growing commercial
rivalry which brought home to the civilized nations
the vital necessity of securing the only remaining
fields -for industrial enterprise and expansion.
It is well, then, to realize that it is for our
advantage--and not alone at the dictates of duty-that we have undertaken responsibilities in East
Africa.

It is in order to foster the growth of

this country, and to find an outlet for our
manufacturers and our surplus energy, that our
farse-eing statesmen and our commercial men advocate
1A
colonial expansion.
Lugard went on further with his enunciation;
There are some who say we have no right in
Africa at all, that it belongs to the natives.

I
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hold that our right is the necessity that is upon
us to provide for our ever-growing population-either by opening new fields of emigration, or
by providing work and employment which the
development of overseas extention entails--and
to stimulate trade by finding new m a r k e t s . ^
The argument, therefore,

is that British colonialism

in East Africa was based in terms of material advantages
beneficial to England.

In Lugard's spirited argument,

colonialism is represented as a consequence of British
capitalist expansion,

its aim and result being the coloni

zation of East Africa irrespective of the injustices of
economic and political domination over the native tribes.
This theory is of special interest since it identifies
colonialism with capitalist exploitation.
The second theory which is of some interest to this
study shows different reasons and motives for colonialism.
The theory of innate superiority of certain races and
innate inferiority of others has been advocated to
justify colonialism.
In his book Ethics of Empire, 1896, H. H. Wyatt,
with special reference to Africa, wrote:
To us [[i.e., the British^] and not to others, a
certain definite duty has been assigned:

to carry

light and civilization into the dark places of the
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world, to touch the.mind!'of Asia and of Africa
with the ethical ideas of Europe to thronging
millions who would■otherwise never know peace
and security-, their first conditions of human,
advance .

^

^

Wyatt's ideals must he greeted with skepticism.
A few missionaries with a sense of true mission came
to some parts of Africa.

The point, however,

is that

individual motivations of these few people should not
he confused with British colonial policies.

It was

wider imperial interests which led Britain to occupy
East Africa.
According to a famous British scholar, colonial
acquisition of Kenya was tied to England's imperialist
policies elsewhere in Africa.

Colin Cross explains

that British entanglement in Africa resulted,
from her entanglement in India.

in part,

He says;

Africa lay on the way to India and whether
the route was around the Cape or through the Suez
Canal it was regarded as essential to prevent
hostile European powers establishing bases there.
This was as much a rationalization as an operative
cause; but pushful British pioneers on the spot
could always claim London's support by using the
argument of communications with India.

The most

obvious chain of conquest on these lines had been
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that in East Africa.. • T o !iprotect the Suez Canal,
it was regarded as essential to control Egypt.
To control Egypt it was essential to control
the hinterland, Sudan.

To control Sudan and

the source of the Nile, on which Egypt depended,
it was necessary to have a railway running from
the East Coast.

To control the railway,

it was

necessary to control Kenya, the territory which
the railway crossed. 17
Apart from the simplicity of Cross' reasoning, there
are several important facts to remember.

First of all,

the Indian Empire was not threatened.
Secondly, Africa was still "the dark continent."
In his book African Discovery, published in 1942,
J. Simmons describes the physical condition of Africa
as follows;
. . . Africa is extremely uninviting.

Vast

stretches of it hardly afford even a sheltering
roadstead, and good natural harbours are very
rare.

Nearly half of it.is baked by desert or

semi-desert; much of the rest by thick forest,
difficult or impossible to penetrate.

Few of the

rivers are navigable."
According to Simmons,

it appears that Cross'

argument is specious and superficial.

East Africa was

not strategically located-for11Britain to mount a
useful defense for India's security.
Other views of British expansion were given in the
Times of London of September 28, I892.

In defense of

British occupation of East Africa, the paper stated,,
the. following;
. . . any withdrawal would be nothing short
of a national calamity.

It would mean not only

the Loss of great capital already expended, but
the destruction of our influence and prestige
throughout Central Africa . . . whether we desire
it or not, the British East African Company must
be identified for all practical purposes with
national p o l i c y . ^
According to the Times, then, the reasons for
British occupation of East Africa were more important
than .the countries themselves.

The motives for’the

occupation were political and economic.

Other theories

of "higher purposes" or'civilizing mission" were only
necessary to help clear the way for this expansion.
Professor Albert Szymarski, a distinguished student
of European colonialism, well expressed the reasons for
European expansion.
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The pressure for the' political expansion of
Europe came primarily from the desire of the
landowning class to increase their expansion,
wealth, and power.
A secondary dynamic of colonialism in thi§
stage was the growing need for raw materials t-o .
satisfy the increasing demands of the growing
urban population.

on

The desire for expansion led to the formal establishment of a British protectorate over Kenya in 1895*

In

1920, Kenya became a British Colony.
The word "protectorate" means an area over which
some.stronger power exercises authority while allowing
the natives some forms of nominal command.

The natives

are forbidden to have direct diplomatic relations with
an outside state, and all foreign powers may only deal
with natives through the protecting government. 21
The greatest political advantage of this arrangement
is that it allows the protecting power to get obedience
from the natives while providing a convenient excuse
when things fail to work out.
The word "colonial" as used in the political sense
is characterized by heavy settlement.

It consists of

settlers who form autonomous government while maintaining
economic and cultural-links with their homelands.

A

colonial relationship is therefore created when one-
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nation establishes and maintains political domination
over a geographically external political unit inhabited
-by others.
The British protectorate over and the eventual
colonization of Kenya were effected through two
complimentary methods;

t*

the first of which w a s ■chicanery.

The tribes were promised British protection in exchange
for their surrender and cession of their territory.
Due to a lack of knowledge in international affairs,
some tribes yielded to these ambiguous, vague and
meaningless promises, thereby losing their sovereignty.
Loss of territories led to the conclusion of various
treaties with Britain.
L. T. L. Oppenheimer, on the effect of treaties
in international laws, makes the following statement:
Although a treaty was concluded with real
consent of the parties,

it is, nevertheless, not

binding if the consent was given in error or
under a delusion produced by a fraud of the
other contracting party.
Thus, it can be argued that the British,

through

a process of pious fraud, duped the tribes into
relinquishing their territorial sovereignty.

It is

perhaps just as well to make a general observation that
contacts between Christian missionaries and the natives,

especially those missionaries Who wanted to see the
country under British rule, had considerable effect
in mollifying the attitudes of the natives towards the
colonizing power.
The second method involved the use of British
military force against those tribes which resisted t-he
entire colonial system.

The reasons for military con

frontation have been described by Tignor:'
In the first place, the British had military
and technological superiority.

The major period

when military force was in continuous use was the
so-called era of pacification.

At that time, the

British used violence in an exemplary fashion,
hoping to render its further use unnecessary.
When the British sent forces against recalcitrant
groups, they inflicted severe military lessons,
burning villages, expropriating livestock, and in
some cases, killing large numbers.

These forays

were designed to demonstrate, not only to the
people against whom they were sent, but to the
neighbors as well, that resistence was futile and
24
rained down intolerable destruction.
One other way British achieved its intentions was
by shrewdly manipulating tensions within the tribe,
finding important collaborators before launching a

military attack.

In spite of"military defeats,

anti-colonial-disturbances among tribes continued.
These were in the form of scattered quasiguerrilla skirmishes during the years 1895 through
1920.
After 1920,
Kikuyus,

some tribes, especially the

continued to seek direct confrontation in

the form of land struggles, labor strikes, and
occasional acts of violence.
After Kenya was declared a colony, a network
of British and native administrators was rapidly
provided.

This was in the form of indirect rule.

The governor ruled through district commissioners
who ruled through indigenous tribal groupings headed
by a chief.

The basic hypothesis of' indirect rule

was that through creating two sets of rulers--British
and native, working either separately or in cooperation
(in which the native chiefs had well-defined duties
and an acknowledged status)--a minimization of conflicts
and retention of the efficient organizational structure
of traditional life would result.
The general control principles were laid down
by Lord Lugard in 1922, as follows:
1.• Native rulers are not permitted to raise and
control armed forces or to .grant permission'
to carry arms.
2.

The sole right to impose taxation in any
form is reserved to the Suzerain power.

3.

The right

to legislation is reserved.

4.

The ^right
to appropriate land on
equitable terms for public purposes
and for commercial purposes is vested
in the governors.

5*

The right
of conforming or otherwise
deciding the choice of the people of
the successor to a Chieftain and of
deposing any ruler for misrule or .other
cause is reserved to the governor,
f Succession is governed^] by native
law and custom, subject m the case of
important chiefs to the approval of
the governor in order that the most
capable claimant may be chosen.

Politically, the concept of indirect rule
achieved two goals:

a total belief in the colonial

government and the foreign advancement of a political
system over the natives.

Similarly, Lugard said

the following:
If continuity and decentralization are as
I have said, the first and most important
conditions in maintaining an effective adminis
tration cooperation is the key-note of success
in its application-continuous cooperation
between every link in the chain, from the head
of the administration to its most junior memberscooperation between the government and the
commercial community, and above all, between
the provincial staff and the native rulers.
Every individual adds his share not only to the

35
accomplishment of the- ideal, hut to the ideal
itself.

Its principles are fashioned by his

patient and loyal application of these
principles, with as little interference
as possible with native customs and mode of
thought.^
Lugard's argument, misplaced as it is, overlooks
two fundamental facts.

First of all, it does not

take into account that the system of "continuous
cooperation" and "decentralization" achieved the
unquestionable authority of the British Crown.
In the second place, this argument ignores the
fact that the system also shifted the focus of authority
away from the legitimate
of British power.

traditional society to those

The chiefs, whose powers were

traditionally balanced through the process of consul
tation with the tribes, became petty tyrants making a
mockery of their beliefs and ruled only because they
had the British force to keep themselves in power.
This in turn disabled the political sub-structures
of the tribes,

slowly diminishing the traditional

values of their democracy.

Another consequence of

the "indirect rule" system of government was that it
subordinated the tribes to the British.

Being politically disorganized and unable to
continue effective resistance against the British,
the tribes faced the challenge of European settlement
on their land.
Jidlaph G. Kamoche described the manner in
which the African tribes lost their land:
As African land was alienated to Europeans,
it became nominally part of the highlands if
the land was 4,000 feet above sea level . . .
when a need arose for the colonial government
to put to public use a part of the African
land a method called "exclusion" was employed
to alienate the desired l a n d . ^
Large amounts of African land were appropriated
by the' Europeans between 1903-19H*

The colonial

government established two types of applicants that
could apply for this land.

Those in the first group,

called Class A, were men of small means and were to
be given small grants of small farms.
B were men with
of

<£

200

Ji

1000

per year.

Those in Class

capital and an assured income

Farms were also available to this

group for purchase on generous terms.

Using this method

of land distribution, a total of 1,052 Class B farms
27
and 257 Class- A farms were created.
This produced
bitter and violent episodes against the colonial

government,, especially from- the' Kikuyu, Maasai,
and Kamba tribes.
In an attempt to resolve the land problems,
the colonial government created "African Reserves”
as a form of compensation for lost land.

These

were designated forest areas which separated European
settlers from the African tribes.

In spite, of

British efforts to resolve the land grievances, the
tribes remained bitter.
In his study of Gikuyu tribal organization, Jomo
Kenyatta underlined the .importance of land in the
African culture.
. . , Land is the key to the people's life;
it secures for them that peaceful tillage of the
soul which supplies their material needs and
enables them to perform their magic and
traditional ceremonies in undisturbed serenity
facing M t . Kenya . . .

it supplies them with the

material needs of life, through which spiritual
and. mental contentment is achieved.

Communion

with the ancestral spirits is perpetuated
through contact with the soul in which the
ancestors of the tribe lie buried . . . the earth
is the mother of the tribe . . .

As it is, by

driving him off his ancestral lands, the
Europeans have robbed him of the material

foundations of his culture,, and reduced him
to a state of serfdom forever . . .

2o

It was the intensification of such land beliefs
which later posed a challenge to European colonization
of the country.
In brief, about one quarter of the land, repre
senting most of the fertile upland territory, was
held by Europeans and was termed "White Highlands."
The Africans remained bitter over the land issue and
gave the colonial government continuous trouble
throughout the colonial period.
Closely connected with the land issue was the
procurement of African labor for European farms.
The European settlers viewed the African landlessness
as a source of cheap farm labor.
Due to the African's resentment concerning the
land issue and their unwillingness to work on European
settlements, the colonial government levied a "Hut
and Poll Tax" on all African male adults.
of this tax required the Africans to work.

The payment
Punitive

measures such as imprisonment and brutal and ruthless
beatings were used on those Africans who failed to pay
the tax.
Complicating the land and tax issues were the low
wages which Africans received from European settlers.
The colonial administration linked African taxes and

low wages as positive factors rtecessary for economic
development.

For European settlers, African labor

was essential in the development of opportunity and
potentiality of agriculture (such as coffee, tea, wheat,
and corn).

The justification used in support of African

labor by the colonial administration was that the
initiative, knowledge, and industrialization of Europe
were needed in the colony and consequently the Africans
would benefit.
The Africans viewed this.in terms of .ruthless con
fiscation of their land.

They argued that, by being

forced to work, the colonial government made it impossible
for them to live otherwise.

They saw little reason to

work beyond the time needed to secure money for the.
payment of taxes and thus repeatedly deserted from
European farms.
Another consequence of African labor was the intro
duction of European agriculture methods to the Africans.
This created a tremendous hardship upon the Africans'
traditional lifestyle of subsistence agriculture.
The European settlers, however,

expected the Africans

to emulate the model of high production and efficiency
and consequently assure themselves a share of the
affluence believed to be the reward of superior
knowledge.

Together with the land issue, British economic
policies in the colony were conditioned by her desire
to become a major manufacturing and capitalist ex
porting country.

This desire was greatly intensified

by the effects of World War I, which had suddenly
exposed her competitive weakness.

This in turn

heightened the importance of creating new markets which
could be directly controlled through the colonial system.
Britain had also accepted large loans from the United
States, which resulted in economic and political
dominance of the United States in areas once dominated
by Britain. 30 The following statement from the Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster explains this fact.
. . . Remember that by the service of our debt
to America we have to find many millions a year,
and at the same time we have to purchase raw
materials from America amounting to many millions
a year.
Every single pound that we can take off the
American exchange so much the better for us,
especially if it is spent within the British
Empire.

The development'of cotton, sugar, and

tobacco--all these are matters of the utmost
importance, not only in providing our .own people
here with employment, but they are essential
because if it is essential to purchase these

commodities they should he purchased from our
own people . ^
The commodities referred to above came from British
exports from her own markets at home and those under
colonial rule.

The colonies were capable of producing

tropical raw materials required for British industries
■and the colonial economies were controlled by Britain
with her own interests in mind.

This view was confirmed

in 1923 by members of the British Empire Cotton Growing
Corporation.
I believe we shall in the future see the whole
of our cotton coming from our own dominions,
£i.e. Empire]..

I believe we shall thus secure

cheaper cotton, cheaper raw materials for the use
of our British manufacturers.

I also believe that

in doing that we will be supplying a market for
our own people beyond the seas, and that the money
that they obtain for their cotton may to a great
extent be spent in making purchases from the mother
country.
It is an ideal for which we all ought to work,
that the money obtained from us should in a different
form come back to this country.

When we are able to

do that we are really though separated by thousands
of miles, an Empire united and strong.
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This view assumed a na*tura'l harmony of economic
unity between the mother country and the colony.
British investment in the colony would speed rapid
development of essential primary products; and in turn
create the desired markets for overseas exports.

11
J

L. S. Amery, a British economist of the period,
explained the multiple virtues of this economic
system in the following manner:;
I think we have never realized sufficiently
the immense economic possibilities of those
colonies, and the immense wealth that could be
created by science,

energy, and organization

in those parts of the world.

The prime object,

of course, of that development must be the
welfare of the inhabitants of those regions.
Our first duty is to them; our object is not
to exploit them, but to enable them materially,
as well as in every other respect, to rise to a
high plane of living and civilization.

But I

am sure as I stand.here that we cannot
develop them and help them without an over
spill of wealth and prosperity that would
be an immense help to this country in the
difficult times ahead.

^3
i

In Kenya,

this system required the establishment of

an export-oriented infrastructure capable of producing
products in demand on world markets such as coffee,
cotton, tea, wheat, etc.
The economic ideology also required that
.colonial development be confined to forms of
production which would not compete with British
manufacturers as colonial consumers preferred
British commodities, however uncompetitive.
T'his committment was justified in terms of the
interests of the local economy since it gave -access
to the world markets and was believed that this
would advance the economic well-being of the
natives. 335
Since the colonial economy was entirely constructed
according to the wishes of and for the benefit of the
home country,

the railroad and other modes of transpor

tation and communication were developed to facilitate
the centralization and exportation of agricultural
products.
In addition, economic and social infrastructures
were created for the benefit of the large Europeanowned import-export companies and for t h e .convenience
of the Europeans.
At the other end, land in the African reserves did
not benefit from these economic arrangements because the

colonial government had decreed that Africans were
forbidden from planting cash crops on their land.
Also, their land did not benefit from any of the
improvements settlers made on their farms.
Economic activities in the industrial sector
involved only the transformation of agricultural
products for overseas markets.
In both the agricultural and industrial
sectors, no minimum salary was set; employers
were free to set salaries for their employees.
About a third of African salary was represented
by payments in kind:

lodgings and small pieces

of land to grow food crops.
Racism accentuated, the differences in living
conditions between Europeans and Africans.
salaries appeared phenomenally low.

African

The average

annual salary was about two hundred dollars in
1961 as against three thousand five hundred
dollars for the Europeans.

Equally large planta

tions, cheap labor, and high yields assured very
comfortable revenue for their owners.
In the public sector, the European earned
about $^200 annually and the African $ 300,

Racial

discrimination had also imposed limits of social
mobility for the Africans, and while the Europeans

filled the highest jobs,^the Africans were
the manual workers.33
Thus, the system of colonial economy entirely
founded on business profit and for the benefit of the
Europeans created unbearable economic difficulties
and unjust social treatment of the Africans.

The

system was also responsible for creating a political
system which was designed to protect the economic
interests of the Europeans at the expense of the
Africans.

With that in mind,

it is my purpose to

analyze briefly events which led to African nationalism
and independence.
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AFRICAN OPPOSITION AND INDEPENDENCE
As discussed before in this study, the Africans
had a striking record of uprisings since the beginning
of colonialism.

There were small-scale rebellions

which never culminated "in major revolts partly because
of European readiness to suppress them.

At first

their uprisings centered on the Africans' resentment
of European settlements.

But later numerous grievances

brought Africans into major conflicts with the Europeans.
The root problem, as mentioned earlier, was the land
issue.

Other grievances were socio-economic and

political.
In 1920, the first African political associa
tion known as the Young Kikuyu Association was
founded.

It voiced grievances over land, taxation,

and the regulation of 1920 which made carrying a
pass--the Kipande--obligatory for all African
adult males.

The association demanded resti

tution to. the tribe of land occupied by the Euro
peans and facilities to develop the economic well
being of the Africans,

it also demanded direct

African representation in the European controlled
legislative council.
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The association also accused the chiefs of being
government stooges.

The founder of the association,

Harry Thuku, expressed.his anger with the Europeans
in 1921:
I, Harry Thuku, am greater than you
Europeans,

I am even greater than the chiefs

of this country.

How is it that I have left

Nairobi without being arrested if it is not
because I am a great man.

I desire if the

Europeans tell you to do any owrk at all, that
you tell them Harry Thuku has refused to allow
you to make camps, or to make roads, or to work
in the station or for the public works' depart
ment . . .

Hearken, everyday you pay hut tax

to the European government 0

Where is it sent?

It is their task to steal the property of the
Agikuyu.
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Thuku's campaign against colonial injustices was
short lived.

He was exiled the following year, and it

was not until 1924 that the Kikuyu Central Association
(KCA) was formed to carry on with Thuku's campaign.
Jomo Kenyatta became its general secretary.

The

Association sent him to England the same year and againin 1931 to air their grievances.

Kenyatta faithfully

reflected the Kikuyu rejection of European domination
and values by later writing his book, Facing Mount
Kenya.

In an article entitled "An African Looks at British
Imperialism,'' which appeared in the January, 1933 issue
of the Negro. Worker in England,' Kenyatta took an
offensive stand by criticizing British policies in
Kenya.

He wrote:
Kenya is the.most important British Colony

in East Africa.

Dur ing the last 35 years,

these

people have been robbed of their best land and
are today reduced to the statue of serfs forced
to work on their own lands for the benefit of
the "white owners," and in some circumstances to
40
work without pay and food.
Kenyatta argued that British imperialism supported
the backward form of social relationships in Kenya and
that the British had succeeded in breaking tribal
organizations and felt no need to listen to the opinions
4l
of the Africans.
He argued further that the Africans
were worse off under the British than they had been
h n
^ He

under their own tribal systems.

.

.

accused the British

of levying taxes on Africans many times over in order to
pay for a huge colonial budget that dwarfed the layout
of the colonial government m

Kenya.43
J

He also argues

that the Africans had to pay the cost of modernization
without receiving any of the benefit's.

Roads and rail

roads for which the Africans paid so dearly in both

labor and taxes did nothing t o J)improve African con
ditions, but made it possible for British merchants to
accumulate and export Kenya's resources for their own

. 4 4

profits.

development.

.

.

To.Kenyatta, this did not represent African
He viewed settled plantations as places

where landless Africans had to go to slave and die
because their land had been given to the British men
45
by the colonial government.
Kenyatta wanted to throw off the chains of British
colonialism and create a new democratic African
society.
Between 1928-1945, many articles by Kenyatta
appeared in African national newspapers abroad, and by
the time he returned to Kenya in- 1946, he had already
become a world famous African politician.

Following

his return, Kenyatta devoted himself to the task of
building KCA to a Kenya wide African political party.
Over time, he developed personal relationships with
leaders from other tribes.

Notably, Oginga-Odinga,

Achieng Oneko, and Paul Ngei.

This team was very

successful in arousing the minds of the people by
stirring up hatred against the British and by their
calls for political freedom.

Wherever they went,

Africans poured into the meetings to hear~them.
Especially when Kenyatta rose to speak, the people
listened in complete silence and rapt attention.

Kenyatta used examples to explain himself.He would contrast the rich European way of life
in Kenya with the exploitation of Africans.
Kenyatta was also reported to say one thing
openly in a public meeting and then take his
tribesmen off by themselves where he spoke
l±6
in.Kikuyu idioms.
The colonial government suspected that the Mau
Mau movement was born out of these secret meetings.
/

Kenyatta was also referred to by the colonial
government as the "most accomplished agitator of all
the Africans."

In fact, by the time Kenyatta returned

to Kenya, he was regarded by the Europeans as their
greatest enemy, and they accused him of thoughtless
opposition to administrative policies which were aimed
at improving the conditions of the Africans.

Zj-7
(

This

was much the same language the Europeans had used
since he became the president of the KCA.
In 1953 > KAU was banned.

The colonial authori

ties could not conceive of any political opposition
to their policies, nor could they accept the
reality of African aspirations strongly advocated
by Kenyatta and other African leaders. 48

They viewed these activities as destructive
and continued to believe that any solution to
the African problems lay in the initiative of
the colonial administration under European
.leadership, not in changing the political system
as Africans demanded.

While some African leaders

believed in political changes, under this situa
tion, Kikuyu resistance to colonial rule became
increasingly militant and more committed to the
use of force to achieve social,
political change.

economic, and

The gap between the colonial

authorities and the Kikuyus widened as each
rejected the' assumptions on which the other's
arguments were b a s e d . ^
As time passed by, reports of oathing. and a
movement called Mau Mau appeared.

The oathing grew

out of a need to mobilize support for political
tactics and to raise the level of unity and political
committment among the Kikuyus.

Josiah Mwangi Kariuki,

himself a Mau Mau detainee, describes the vows and
promises made by members of the movement in oathtaking ceremonies j
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I speak the truth and vow before our God
And by this Batuni oath of our movement
Which is called the movement of fighting
That if I am called on to kill for our soil
If I am called on to shed my blood for it
I shall obey and I shall never surrender
And if I fail to go
May this oath kill me,
May this he-goat kill me,
May this seven kill me,
May this meat kill me.
I speak the truth and vow before our God
And before our people of Africa
That I shall never betray our country
That I shall never betray anybody of thismovement to
to the enemy
Whether the enemy be European or African
And if I do this
May this oath kill me, etc.
I speak the truth and vow before our God
And by this Batuni oath of our movement
That I shall never sell my country for money or
any other thing
That I shall abide until my death by all the promises
that I have made this day
That I shall never disclose our secrets to our enemy
Nor shall I disclose them to anybody who does not
belong to the movement
And if I transgress against any of the vows that I
have thus consciously made
I shall agree to any punishment that the movement
shall decide to give me
And if I fail to do these things
May this oath kill me, e t c . 50
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At the same time, po.l-itidal activities among other
tribes assumed various•forms, such as labor strikes,
political demonstrations and selective political violence.
These activities made it clear to the colonial govern
ment that the idea of "freedom" was common to all Africans.
In spite of these developments,

the colonial government’s

.attitudes did not change much, and a declaration of a
"state of emergency" was declared in October, 1952.
The oathing and a state of emergency accelerated
the Kikuyu exodus to the forests where they ambushed
and killed European settlers with the help of Kikuyu
employees.

African collaborators,

especially colonial

chiefs, were killed.
The colonial government believed that by locking
up African leaders,

this would in turn disable the

movement, and Kenyatta and other prominent Africans
were detained.

This, however,

did not stop the movement

but rather precipitated more violent resistance through
out the country.
Although perhaps a military defeat, the move
ment was a great political success resulting in
greater flexibility of colonial leadership in meeting
African demands.

The initial flexibility occurred in 195^ when
"principles of multiracialism" were incorporated
into what was called, the "Lyttelton Constitution."
The following year African political associa
tions, on a district level, were permitted, hut
the Kikuyus were barred from political activity.
The non-violent African leadership fell to other
tribes.
In 1957»
tive Council.

six Africans were elected to the Legisla
They used this opportunity to press for

greater political concessions from Britain.

The aim

was to pressure the British for a constitutional
conference which would lead to independence.
By i960 , there were fourteen African members of
the Legislative council,

including such men as Oginga

Odinga, Tom Mboya, James Gichuru, Julius Kiano, Ronald
Ngala, and Daniel Moi. 'The African members of the
Legislative Council decided to form a national political
party and bring all tribal political associations under
a single political union.

The Kenya African National

Union (KANU) was launched in i960, and James Gichuru,
a Kikuyu, was elected its president on the understanding
that he was only holding the seat for Kenyatta.
Oginga Odinga was elected Vice President.

Mboya

became its general secretary, but Ngala, a politician
from the Coast Province chose not to join.

Moi Kalenjin.,

also refused to join KANU. . The reasons these men did
not join KANU were perhaps justifiable in that, once
independence .was won, they feared the Kikuyus would
secure political dominance.
In the same year Ngala formed the Kenya
African Democratic■Union (KADU) which was joined
by Moi's Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masai
United Front, the Kenya African Peoples Party, the
Coast African Political Union, and the Somali
National Front.
The KADU objective was to work towards a
multi-racial self government within the existing
political system.

The most significant aspect of

this was that the party represented the people who
felt that their interests would be threatened by a
kikuyu and Luo dominated alliance. 53'
KANU was demanding a fresh constitutional
conference and new elections.

KANU also demanded

the "unconditional" release of Kenyatta under
whose leadership it would form a predominently
African government.
Each party was pressing for a constitutional
structure most likely to secure it in power, but despite
their political differences, both parties agreed to work
together as a team on most issues of African independence.
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A formal expression of this agreement was adopted when
the group visited Kenyatta at Lodwar.
This meeting of KANU and KADU delegates
at- Lodwar under the chairmanship of the national
leader Jomo Kenyatta and attended by fellow-freedomfighters Paul Ngei, B. M. Kaggia and Peter Kigondu
unanimously resolved:
1.

That unity among all Africans is essential
for our struggle towards independence
and should be pursued relentlessly.

2.

That meantime it is agreed that KANU and
KADU work together and in full consultation
as from today on the immediate questions of
(a)

immediate and unconditional release of
Kenyatta;

(b)
3.

full independence for Kenya in 1961.

The meeting being convinced that personali
ties and selfishness, mutual suspicion and
fears may be at the bottom of current mis
understandings and disunity, calls on all
African people and members of Legislative
Council and party leaders to completely
refrain from those negative and disruptive
attitudes, and work together for the good
of Kenya.

'

ty..

That to pursue the above, the meeting
recommends the setting up of a joint
. consultative committee of the KANU
Governing Council and KADU Supreme
Council and their respective parlia
mentary groups to facilitate greater
cooperation and collaboration and
closer association.
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In August of 1961 , Jomo Kenyatta was released.

.He

immediately became KANU's president.
KADU, on the other hand, was becoming in
creasingly popular with European settlers and, on
the. whole, repudiated Ken yatta's leadership.

7

This period also marked a phase of communication
between the Africans and the British government.

A series

of constitutional conferences both in Kenya and London
were called where British officials and African leaders
talked about constitutional changes.
KADU's plan at these meetings was devised by European
supporters,

essentially to protect prevailing land rights

and to prevent political domination over the weaker groups
by KANU.
In the Lancaster House Conference attended by
Kenyatta, KADU's plan was strongly supported, not
just by the Europeans but also by the British

government.

In the end,. I^/VNU abandoned its own

plan and accepted a British version of the KADU
. plan, providing for a bi-cameral legislature and
for six regional assemblies.

This would have

entrenched political powers but limited financial
powers.

KANU won on through free elections and

Kenyatta's release.

5&

In the general elections held in.1961, KANU won
83 of the 12^ House of Representative seats and won in
every Province.

It also won the majority in the Senate

and controlled three of the seven regional assemblies,
namely Central,.Eastern, and Nyanza.

KADU's victories

were in the Coast (Ngala’s territory), the Rift Valley
(Moi's territory), and the Western Province.
Kenyatta's presence dominated'the whole election.
Odinga emerged as the number two man in KANU.

He had

a long personal relationship with Kenyatta, but his
political powers in Luoland were unmatched.
still, faced political opposition from KADU.
included five Kikuyus,

were Kikuyus.

His cabinet

four Luo, and six other tribes

with one representative each.
was Vice-President,

Kenyatta

Apart from Odinga, who

all other senior cabinet ministers

Mboya was assigned the ministry of labor.

In the 1963 general elections KANU won.again, and
in December of that year the country became independent;
Kenyatta was sworn in as the country's first Prime Minister..
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POST INDEPENDENCE ERA
Kenyans looked to their government with great hopes,
pride and satisfaction.

They believed that the government

led by fellow Africans would bring fruits of independence
to all citizens equally.

The spiritual leader of the

independence movement Jomo Kenyatta, was seen as the
symbol of economic and political justice.

He had been

detained by the colonial government, and had suffered with
the rest of the citizens.

People called him Mzee, a

swahili word meaning a supreme elder, and as such trusted
by the people to be a fair and honorable guardian.
the flag represented this spirit.

Even

It was composed of red,

green and black, each color representing the independence
nationalism.

Red

blood shed in the years of strife

towards independence.

Green represented the green pas

tures of the land and black represented the people,
pendent of colonialism.
people were short lived.

inde

Unfortunately, the hopes of the
The first year of independence

was wrought with many changes.
The problem of developing national unity and a
new sense of national identification which goes
beyond tribal loyalties is being faced in one after
another of the countries of Africa, both before and
after independence--African countries are composed

of many tribal societi.es, ^each with its own history,
loyalties, vested interests and. prejudices.

These

societies had expressed no desire for unification;
rather, they have long been divided by suspicion,
rivalry, or open hostility.
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The foregoing observation of William Bascom was no
less true for Kenya than for other newly independent
African states.

Once independence had been achieved, the

logic of KANU's leadership evaporated, leaving a residue
of intertribal animosities and suspicions.

Kenyatta.

recognized the dangers of the disolution of national unity
and appealed to all Kenyans to perpetuate the unity he had.
fostered during his leadership of the. national liberation
struggle.

He perceived in the existence of KADU and its

regionalism a major stumbling block in the realization of
this goal.

Coincidentally, Kenyatta wished to extend his

personal power beyond his Kikuyu base to the Coast, the Rift
Valley and Western Province.
In 1964, Kenyatta, then the Prime Minister,

engineered

the establishment of the Republic and his election as
President.

Arguing that KANU and KADU had shared goals,

and that existence of two competing parties was illogical
and disfunctional, he also arranged the dissolution of
KADU, leaving the Kikuyu-dominated KANU as the country's
c'o
only legal political organisation.
However, he was clever
enough to obscure the true intent of Kadu's demise by
appointing Odinga, a Luo, as Vice President of both KANU

and of Kenya.

Tom Mboya, another non-Kikuyu potential

rival of Kenyatta, was relegated to the insignificant
post of Minister of Constitutional Affairs.

At the

same time, the most important ministries including those
for Finance, Economic Planning, Defense,

Foreign Affairs,

Justice, and Land, were assigned to Kikuyus.

Currio.usly,

all but one of Kenyatta's top Kikuyu appointees had little
involvement with the freedom movement.
This led to accusations of tribalism,

especially

from former KADU leaders, who alleged that the Kikuyu
were given preferential treatment in both cabinet and
civil service appointments.

Such feelings were shared by

non-Kikuyu KANU members of parliament.

Strong criticism

f*

also came from Kikuyus in Central Province,
the districts of Nyeri and Muranga.

especially in

These Kikuyu were

critical of Kenyatta's ■favoritism toward their kinsmen
from Kenyatta's home district of Kiambu.
References in parliament to the problem of
tribalism increased.

These references were pre

dominantly to the alleged dominance of the Kikuyus
over other tribes.

The Kikuyu appeared to many to

be the major beneficiaries of independence dominating
both the bureaucracy and the country's economy.

So

explicit did this become that one Luo member of par
liament felt it necessary to warn that there was no
place for establishing one clan or one tribe as a ruling
class in African society.

By the end of the year,
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fears of Kikuyu dominance in government and
therefore control over policy making were
regularly voiced in and out of parliament.
Widespread criticism also alleged that Kikuyus were'
dominating the country's economy.
Kenyatta still faced the problem of land distribution
to the poor, especially concerning those who had lost
their land in the struggle for Kenya's independence.
Many KANU members of parliament called on the government
to seize land owned by Europeans for free distribution
to the landless.

They also criticized the government

for failing to restrict foreigners' ownership of land.
In answering his critics, Kenyatta blamed everything on
the colonial government.

He reiterated his government's

committment to eliminating all forms of injustice, but
warned the people that it was impossible for everyone in
the country to own land.

He pointed out that wealth and

progress could not be achieved overnight or by magic and
wishful thinking, rather it would come from the physical
labor of all Kenyans.
Despite these excuses, strong criticisms continued
charging the government with "Kikuyu corruption,"
blaming it for creating the gap between the haves and
the have'nots,

and calling it anti-democratic.

In response,

the government pledged itself to a

program of modernization and development designed to
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ensure an equitab-le distribution of wealth and to
guarantee political democracy.

The most important

element of the program was that through governmental
efforts, the African tradition of "mutual social
responsibility" would play an important role In the
development of the country, would establish a basis
for political democracy, and would bring about a
unified national effort aimed at the goals of develop
ment.

It was the government's function to control the

whole process and to ensure that progress was made
according to the dictates of "mutual social responsi
bility" .
Describing.the virtues of "African Socialism," Tom
Mboya said:
. . . To make progress toward these fundamental
objectives, we have decided to employ the system
of African Socialism; we must draw particularly on
those African roots that are especially among all
tribes in Kenya:

political democracy and mutual

social responsibility.

In the traditional African

society in Kenya only one requirement was imposed
,on an individual before he could participate fully
and equally in political affairs.

He had to be a

mature, responsible member of that society and
nothing else.

Indeed, the Constitution already

guarantees that every person in Kenya is entitled

6A
• *:

to the fundamental rights ^and freedoms of the
individual whatever his race, tribal place of
origin or residence or other local connections,
political opinion,, color,

creed, or sex^-during

■our struggle for Uhuru, we always asserted that
only through freedom and human rights could
the people cooperate fully with the government ^
(author's emphasis) .^
There were three problems with Mboya's idealism.
First,

it ignored the problem of tribalism,

the in

compatible customs and traditions of which fragmented
Kenyan society.
Tribal antagonisms, which had been encouraged and
exploited by the colonial government, undermined national
commitment to KANU's developmental and democratic goals.
Briefly subordinated to the struggle for national
liberation,

the nefarians affects of tribalism were

exacerbated by the Kikuyu domination of KANU and the
national government.

The necessary and laudatory goals

of development and modernization were thus interpreted
as benefitting only the ruling tribe at the expense of
the others and subverted any chance of a national con
sensus on mobilization for these goals.
The second problem was closely related to the first.
Tribal relations of authority were based on tradition, the
individual defining his political allegiance in terms of
the recognized leader of his tribe.

Thus, the Kikuyu

were strongly attached to Kenyatta because he was the
leader of their tribe.

Similarly, Oginga Odinga remained

the undisputed leader.of the Luo despite his relegation
to. the Vice Presidencies of KANU and the Republic.
Mboya, unrecognized as its leader by any tribe, had
no traditional claims to authority.

In order to achieve

national mobilization for KANU's developmental goals,
such traditional definitions of leadership had to be
replaced'by rational-legal or charismatic basis for
authority.

As leader of the struggle for national

liberation, Kenyatta may have acquired a rationallegal or charismatic legitimacy for.his leadership,
but the post-independence resurgence of tribalism
subverted whatever authority that had been thus created,
leaving only the traditional bases of leadership.
Kenyatta was forced, therefore, to work through tribal
leaders for the accomplishment of KANU's goals at the
expense of establishing his legitimacy as the leader
of Kenya, not just leader of the Kikuyu.
The third problem was related to the difficulty of
achieving the goals of "African Socialism." and political
democracy while tribal economic relationships remained
unmodernized.
The aspect of tribalism always comes info play
on important roles in the country's political leadership.
For example, the President has difficulties retaining
political support from a different tribe without the
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intermediary of tribal leaders.v This was a problem
. A»

which was never recognized as an obstacle to progress.
While all tribal cultures included the notion of
"mutual social responsibility", the material benefits
of traditional collectivism were not distributable
outside the tribe.

The tribal basis for the economic

ingredients of African socialism,

therefore, was

incomptible with the goals of national economic equity.
Kikuyus, who dominated both KANU and the government,
tended to favor other Kikuyus in employment and
distributing the available resources of Kenya, regardless
of their kinsmen’s political orientation prior to inde
pendence.

Luos and other tribesmen who were more

qualified for jobs or who were active in the struggle
for independence naturally resented such discrimination.
Mboya's idealism, whether the result of naivete
or delusion, was .exploited by an increasingly cynical
KANU leadership which gradually subverted whatever
democracy was left in the organization.

Of course,

they denied any such intent and continued to project
a party image which was clearly at odds with reality.
Before independence our party was rightly
geared to the struggle against colonialism.

Its

structure, organization and slogans and even
mood . . .

Now that we are free, we have to

reconstruct the party for the task of nationbuilding,

economic freedom, today the party is

*

the government and must teach the people to
accept, respect and trust the government and its
officers . . .

To ensure effective working of

the party . . .

it must he organized to provide

real and serious dehates on policy*

It must

not be just a contest for factions and personali^

ties.

f,o

The dichotomy between image and intent becomes more
striking when one examines the steps KANU's Kikuyu
leadership took to insure its perpetuation in power.
KADU had been "voluntarily" disolved in 196*1.

In

order to mitigate the fears of the non-kikuyu membership
of the defunct party, whose suspicion had been raised
with the increasingly heavy-handed Kikuyu domination
of Kenyan politics, Kenyatta and his allies sought to
allocate ceremonial and symbolic authority to members
of other tribes.

In a partial response to an emerging

left-wing of KANU, the leadership designated Oginga
Odinga as party Vice President, hoping to defuse the
Luo leader's strident criticism of the regime
Vice President Odinga became the focal point of
left wing dissention.

A speech he. made in which he

said "communism is like food to me" was taken as
significant by many people.

He complained that he

had been stripped of all government power when he
was appointed Vice President.

He became increasingly

critical of other ministers and' in April, 1965, he
attacked Mboya and Ngala for being tools of Great
Britain and the United S t a t e s . ^ The ploy did not
succeed and the leadership began to fear an eventual
Odinga succession to the aging Kenyatta.

Mboya,

ever the faithful tool of the leadership, maneuvered
a KANU conference to redefine the party Vice' Presidency,
replacing its single incumbant, Odinga, with an eight
man Vice Presidence representing Kenya’s eight districts.
The move was specifically designed to eliminate Odinga
as Kenyatta’s designated successor, an intent made
all the more clear by the purging of Odinga’s supporters
during the same conference.

Odinga angrily resigned

from his party and government posts.
You have not given any consideration to me as
your number two in state affairs.

I have a con

science and this in fact does prick me when I earn
public money but with no job to do.

I consider

this a waste of public money and I am worried lest
the future generations question my sincerity when
they would learn that I allowed myself to hold a
sinecure post in the midst of poverty and misery
in our country.

With this realization I cannot

continue to hold this position any longer and
I hereby tender my resignation.

The final elimination of Odin£a\ was achieved some months
later after he had formed the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU),
a Luo-based opposition party with socialist leanings.
The party was banned and Odinga imprisoned.
.Joseph Murumbi, a half-Masai, replaced Odinga as
Kenya's Vice President but resigned a few months later,
partly due to political pressures from some of his
dpponents in the government.

Daniel Arap Moi, a

Kalenjin, was appointed Kenya's Vice President--a
position he held for twelve years.

Even with Moi as

Vice President, Mboya considered himself most likely
successor to President Kenyatta.

66 He. was national secretary

of KANU, and unlike party Vice Presidents, who represented
tribal regions,, Mboya held a national position which
represented all ethnic regions.

However, M b o y a 's attempt

to project himself as Kenyatta's successor failed.
Kenyatta, who in 1968 was about
health,
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years old and in poor

had not publicly designated or favored any person,

as his successor.

At the same time Kikuyus,

especially

from Kenyatta's own district of Kiambu,. became increasing
ly concerned about the possibility of a non-Kikuyu
successor.
Mboya was seen as a roadblock to another Kikuyu
President.

Two well known journalists in Kenya pick up

the train of events.

Tom Mboya, the youthful Secretary-General of
the party,--who,

in the independence movement,

had outwitted some of Macmillan's ablest ministers-,
and who, because of his legendary efficiency,
organizational brilliance, cosmopolitan upbringing
and deeply right-wing world outlook, was the darling
of establishment forces both at home and in the
west and was thus regarded by such forces and
other observers as their favourite successor .to
Kenyatta.

The argument goes that once Mboya--who

was of course doing all these things to enrich
his own position--had performed his function
(namely to help the family to liquidate Odinga
politically), he (Mboya) had outlived his useful
ness and must himself be liquidated .^
f
The family refers to the men who were around Kenyatta
so

and may or may not have been related to him by blood.
On July 5, 1969» Tom Mboya was shot dead in Nairobi.
The assassin, a Kikuyu, admitted in a public enquiry
that he had been ordered to kill the "Luo” from the top.
Key government officials, all of them Kikuyus, were
suspected as collaborators, but none was ever tried or
convicted for the crime. ^
Mboya's murder led to a period of political crisis
between the Luos and the Kikuyus.

The Luos started a

campaign aimed at uniting other tribe's against the

Kikuyus.
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Kenyatta,

m

the meantime, appealed for
V

calm.
Brothers and sisters,

I know that every one

of us is very much grieved* hut what I appeal
to you my fellow citizens at this unfortunate
time--for as you all know death is inevitable and
it is a path which every one will pass, whether
he likes it or not, I appeal to you to identify
ourselves as Kenyans,

to unite together as one

people, and one big tribe of Kenya.
As we know,

it is only love and unity that

can rid us of the disease of separation and dis
unity, we should not be thinking in terms of I
come from that place or that district or that
tribe, because all of us are of one tribe and
that tribe is Kenya. 71
Despite Kenyatta’s assurances, the Kikuyus reacted
to the Luo threat by restaring oathing which, as in
colonial times, was to enhance the Kikuyu solidarity.
While taking the oath, the Kikuyus swore that the flag
of Kenya should not leave -the House of Mumbi/^ (Mumbi
is the legendary mother of the Kikuyus.)
The oathing ceremonies were condemned all over the
country by other tribes who argued that the Kikuyus
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were dividing the country for selfish reasons.' In
October of 1969, President Kenyatta visited Nyanza

•Province in his continuing effort to obscure Kikuyu
domination, but the visit proved catastrophic.
On arrival, Kenyatta’s car was stoned, and Kenyatta's
bodyguard returned fire, killing twenty people and
w o u n d m g hundreds more/

Kenyatta returned to Nairobi

without delivering a speech.

With the banning of KPU,

improsonment of Odinga, and the death of Tom Mboya,
the Luos were left with no political alternatives.
Between 1970-1976, Kenyatta was the dominant force
of Kenya’s politics.

KANU was, to a great extent,

rubber stamping his policies.

Kenyatta dominated

every political scene, usually by way of arbitrary
decrees.

He supressed political opposition by detaining

dissidents.

During that same period, Josiah Kariuki,

a prominent Kikuyu politician who attacked governmental,
economic and political policies, was assassinated.

It

was revealed in a parliamentary hearing that a former
commissioner of police was seen with Kariuki hours before
he died.
There were, however, limits to the flagrant abuse
of constitutional procedures which even some of Kenyatta's
kinsmen recognized.

Beginning in October, 1976, a group

of Kikuyu politicians,

fearing the Kenyatta was already

too old and physically weak to carry on as head of
the government, began another campaign aimed at changing
the Kenya Constitution in order to prevent Moi from
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v ■
■becoming President. Chapter llo, Section 1 of the
Kenya Constitution reads:
1.

If the office of President becomes vacant
by reason of the death or resignation of
the President, or by reason of his ceasing
to hold office by virtue of Section 10
or Section 12 of this Constitution (qv)
an election of a President shall be held
within the period of ninety days immedi
ately following the occurrence of that
vacancy, and it shall be held in the
manner prescribed by Section 5 (5) of
this Constitution (qv).

2.

While the office of President is vacant
as aforesaid,

the function of that office

shall be exercised by the Vice President;
or if there is no Vice President, or if
the Vice President considers that he is
for any reason unable to discharge the
functions of the office of President, by
such minister as may be appointed by
the cabinet.
The KANU Constitution called for an annual delegate's
conference every year, the last KANU meeting was held
in 1966 with the main purpose of ousting Odinga from
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KANU.
In 1976, a KANU meeting was convened with the

sole purpose of preventing Moi ^from becoming President
in the event of the death of Kenyatta.

The idea was

not only to change the Constitution and make it impossible,
for Moi to succeed Kenyatta, but also to vote Moi out
of his position as KANU Vice President.

(After Odinga1s

removal from KANU, the party went back to the single
n O

Vice Presidency.

Both strategies failed.

a prominent Masai politician,

Oliotiptip,

obtained more than the

two-thirds vote from members of parliament opposing
both moves.

Kenya's Attorney General also warned of

possible criminal prosecutions of those behind the
"Change the Constitution Movement."

Kenyatta died in

1978, and Moi became the country's President

He appointed

Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, as Vice President mainly to muster
the support of the Kikuyus.

KANU has not held a meeting

since 1976, and Moi has repeatedly delayed the election
of party officials citing his chairmanship of the
Organization of African Unity as the cause of the delay.
Moi has also barred Odinga and his supporters from
joining KANU.
The government,

in the meantime, has amended the

Constitution--disallowing the legal existence of an
organized opposition— thereby legalizing a style of
government that has effectively prevailed since 1964..
This move reflects government's increasing sensitivity
to opposition.

CONCLUSION
After the brief experience of inter-tribal soli
darity which forced the British to relinquish colonial
rule, the post-independence era in Kenya has been
characterized by a return to traditional tribally specific
political cultures.

The Kikuyu, who led the struggle

for national liberation,

have succeeded in dominating

both KANU and the Kenyan government, both by eliminating
real or potential opposing political organizations,
as KADU and the KPU, and individuals,

such

such as Odinga,

Mboya and Kariuki, and by appealing to the common interests
of all Kenyans to economically develop and socially modern
ize the country.

In juxtaposition to the appeal for

national unity and modernization,

the Kikuyu elite has

proved to be incapable or unwilling to discard their
traditional tribal exclusivity and to share political
power by allowing other tribes to participate fully in
the political process.

They simply cannot conceive of

the possibility of being governed by an uncircumcized
Luo.
In order to achieve the ambitious economic goals
of "African Socialism" and the equity implied by political
democracy,

the Kikuyu elite will have to abandon their.

tribal beliefs and replace them' with the secular and
■U

empirically proven beliefs of modern societies.
far such a transformation has been impossible.

Thus
As a

result, the incompatibility of tribalism and moderniza
tion delegitimizes the regime among the majority of the
population and postpones the realization of Kenyatta's
dream of a single Kenyan "tribe".
Tribalism is a fact of life in contemporary Kenya.
The practices and attitudes of thousands of years are
proving resistant to change.

Traditional tribal antaga-

nisms and exclusivenesses, born of the ages and nurtured
by the British stubbornly impede the achievement of
national goals.

While all the tribes shared behavioral

patterns on which,
could be built,

it was assumed,

"African Socialism"

the differences in the application of

these behaviors has fragmented Kenyan society.
This thesis has traced the origin of and the recent
history of tribalism in Kenya.

Individual tribal

identities helped stimulate and perpetuate political
rivalries.

However, the government emphasis in "African

Socialism" rested on the assumption that Kenyan society
was made up of one whole African tribe, a factor the
leaders believed would contribute to the effectiveness
of governmental undertakings of economic quality and
political democracy.

This study has shown that the

Kenyan people have a strong sense of tradition and revere/.- .
their historic tribal identities.

This produces a deep

and abiding awareness of traditional bonds of social
solidarity making it impossible to integrate different
tribes into one social structure.
The government's goal of political democracy has
not been met because it was based on misconceived
notions of "African Socialism" which mistakenly
ignored tribal exclusiveness.

In other words,

"African tribalism" existed before "African Socialism"
and continues to dominate Kenyas society.
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